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STUDENT SYMPOSIUM:
BLUE SKY LAWS
Ohio Securities Act: Powers, Sanctions
and ConstitutionalObjections
blue sky laws and their modern counterpart
have as their objective protection of the investing public when
dealing with financial securities.' Accordingly, the laws are designed
to prevent and punish fraud in the issuance and sale of securities
to the public.2 The laws are generally directed to the original distribution market as opposed to the secondary market? This purpose has been held to be within the valid exercise of state police
power and not in violation of the federal constitution.4
OTH THE EARLY

Although there are few objections to the purpose of the blue
sky laws, the means by which the purpose is achieved has prompted
criticism, opposition, and attack on the basis of unconstitutionality.?
Some of these objections will be considered in the following discussion in relation to the Ohio Securities Act.
I.
A.

THE OHIO SECURITIES ACT

Obect of the Act

The modern Ohio Blue Sky Law became effective on July 22,
1929 and is entitled the Ohio Securities Act (OSA) 6 The source
of authority for the act and its predecessor' is the Ohio constitution
which provides that corporations may be classified and that a govI See Groby v. State, 109 Ohio St. 543, 550, 143 N.E. 126, 128 (1924); Nida,
The Ohio Division of Securities and the Ohio Securities Act, 13 OHIO ST. L.J. 427, 434

(1952).
2 Ibid.
3 See Nida, supra note 1, at 445. The secondary market is a term encompassing all
security trading after the security has been initially issued to the investing public. It
includes trading between private individuals, dealers and individuals, dealers and institutional investors, dealers and other dealers, and trading on the stock exchanges. See
Nida, supra note 1, at 442.
4 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
See Boesel, Analysis of the Ohio
Securities Act, 5 W RES. L. REV. 352, 353 (1954)
5 See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., supra note 4.
6 OHio REV. CODE ch. 1707.
7Ohio Blue Sky Law, 103 Ohio Laws 743 (1913)
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ernmental body having supervisory and regulatory powers over the
issuance and sale of a corporation's stocks and securities could be
created.'
The Ohio Securities Act, like the blue sky laws of other states,
has as its objective the prevention of fraud and misrepresentation in
the issuance and sale of securities to the investing public.'
B.

Composition of the Ohio Securities Act

The Ohio act employs a multipronged strategy in its attempt
to achieve investor protection. It requires disclosure of information
relating both to the security to be issued and to the issuer.1" It requires registration of the security with the Ohio Division of Securities"l and also requires, what has been referred to by some persons,
as the onerous licensing of dealers in securities. 2 In addition, the
Division of Securities is given broad discretionary powers in the
administration and enforcement of the act.'3 The constitutionality
of the foregoing strategies and powers will be analyzed in the following discussion, as will be the constitutionality of the regulation
of the secondary market.
(1) The Secondary Market.-Generally, the blue sky laws
do not attempt to regulate the secondary market.' 4 It has been indicated that those states which do attempt to regulate the secondary
market may do so based on the valid exercise of state police power.'"
8 OHIO CoNsT. art. XIII, § 2.
9 See Report of Ohio State Bar Association Committee on Corporation Law and
Committee on Blue Sky Law, in 1 OHIO BAR No. 42 (Jan. 15, 1929)
1iOHIO REv. CODE §§ 1707.05, 1707.08, 1707.09.
" Ibd.
12 OjIo REv. CODE § 1707.14. The OSA also requires the licensing of salesmen
of securities. A requisite for the issuance of a salesman's license is that the salesman
must be employed by a particular licensed dealer in securities. OHIo REV. CODE S
1707.16.
13 The OSA provides that the Division of Securities may issue a dealer s license
when it is satisfied that the dealer is of "good business repute." OHio REV. CODE §
1707.15. See text accompanying notes 46-52 mnfra. The OSA also provides that the
Division of Securities may refuse to qualify a security because of "grossly unfair terms"
in its issuance. OHio REV. CODE § 1707.09. See text accompanying notes 61-81 mnfra.
In addition, the broad definition of the term "fraud" increases the discretionary power
of the Division of Securities. OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.01 (J).
Furthermore, the Division of Securities has the power to (1) conduct investigations
and examinations (Oio REv. CODE § 1707.23); (2) conduct hearings on any plan
for the issuance of securities in reorganizations (OiO REV. CODE § 1707.04); (3)
initiate criminal proceedings for violation of the OSA (Oio REV. CODE § 1707.23
(E)); and (4) obtain injunctive relief (OIo REV. CODE §§ 1707.25, .26)
14 See materials discussed note 3 supra.
15See Comment, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1934); Comment, 10 So. CAL. L. REV.
483, 489 (1937); 6 So.CAL. L REv. 233 (1933).
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Nevertheless, the aspect of the secondary market relating to sales
of securities by the bona fide owner has raised some valid constitutional objections. The objection to such regulation based on the
federal constitution is that it is violative of the fourteenth amendment rights to freely enjoy, possess, and dispose of property. 6 The
California courts have accepted this view and have stated that the
legislature cannot exercise its police power under the guise of
"general welfare" so as to interfere with such rights.' 7 Furthermore, the California courts have indicated that a bona fide private
owner of securities is not required to obtain a dealer's license before attempting to sell his securities."8 Subsequent California decisions have stated that where a private owner offers the securities
for sale to the public as such, the sale is subject to regulation;' but
where the private owner sells the securities in the ordinary course
of business, the transaction is not subject to regulation unless the
seller is the issuer or underwriter of the securities, in which case
regulation is proper.20
Many states have statutes which distinguish between isolated
transactions by private owners of securities and continuous dealings in securities." The former are not subjected to regulation
while the latter are.'
The scope of the first Ohio Blue Sky Law was limited to the
original distribution market, although it did extend to transactions
which falsely appeared to be in the secondary market but which were
in fact original distributions."8 In addition, under the first Ohio blue
sky law the term "dealer" was defined so as to exclude "the underwriter of the security who is a bona fide owner of the security and
'
disposes of his own property for his own account."24
The constitutionality of this law was upheld in Hall v.Gezger-Jones Co. 25 The
drafters of Oho's second blue sky law, the Ohio Securities Act,
apparently did not intend to regulate the secondary market, but
rather intended that the fraud provisions of the act should accom16 See People v. Pace, 73 Cal. App. 548, 238 Pac. 1089 (1925); People v. Craven,
219 Cal. 522, 27 P.2d 906 (1933).
17 People v. Pace, supra no.re 16.
18 Ibid. See Loss & CowT, BLUE SKY LAw 15 (1958).
19 People v. Craven, 219 Cal. 522, 27 P.2d 906 (1933).
20 Tb.h
21 See Annot., 1 A.L-R.3d 614 (1965).
22 Ibd.
23 See Nida, supra note 1, at 445.
24
Ohio Blue Sky Law, 103 Ohio Laws 743 (1913)
25242 U.S. 539 (1917).
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plish the objective of investor protection2
However, the secondary
market is brought within the regulatory provisions of the act by
the use of the pervasive term "transactions" requiring registration."

Notwithstanding the use of such a broad term, regulation of the
secondary market is limited by the exempt transactions provision of
the OSA.2" "A sale of securities made by or on behalf of a bona
fide owner" who is "neither the issuer nor a dealer is exempt" if
made in good faith.'
It appears therefore that Ohio's position is
similar to that of California in regard to a sale by the bona fide
owner of securities."0
Other aspects of the secondary market are not exempted from
regulation under the OSA.3 This has consequently created problems for both those having to comply with the OSA, as well as for

the Division of Securities."
(2) Lzcensng.--The Ohio Securities Act is essentially a licensing and inspection type of securities regulation. 8 Investor
protection is extended by the requirement that dealers in securities
must be licensed. 4 The issue of whether a state has the power to
regulate securities by means of a licensing statute designed to protect
the investing public was presented and answered in the affirmative
in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. 5 The Supreme Court ruled that comprehensive licensing laws do not violate the federal constitution 3
The object of licensing is the prevention of fraud in sales of
securities by issuing licenses only to responsible, trustworthy, and
solvent dealers."
An individual desiring a dealer's license must
26

See Report of Ohio State Bar Association Committee on Corporation Iaw and
Committee on Blue Sky Law, in I OHO BAR No. 42 (Jan. 15, 1929); Nida, supra note
1.
27
Omo REv. CODE 5 1707.06. See Nida, supra note 1, at 446.
28
Om-o REv. CODE 5 1707.03.
29
OHio REv. CODE 5 1707.03 (B).
3
0 See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
31
OHIo REV. CODE § 1707.03.
82 See Nida, supra note 1, at 446.
83 See OHIo REV. CODE 5§ 1707.14-.22; Boesel, supra note 4, at 353. See also
Catterlin v. State, 16 Ohio L Abs. 410 (Ct. App.), appea denmd, 128 Ohio St. 110,
190 N.E. 578 (1934).
3
4 The licensing requirements attempt to "prevent deception and save credulity and
ignorance from imposition, as far as this can be done by the approved reputation of the
seller of securities and authoritative information." Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S.
539 (1917).
35242 U.S. 539 (1917).
86 Ibid.
37
See Groby v. State, 109 Ohio St. 543, 550, 143 N.E. 126, 128 (1924); Boesel,
supra note 4, at 365.
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supply the Division of Securities with detailed information. 8 The
dealer's solvency is assured by requiring applicants to have a net worth
of 10,000 dollars.39 This amount may be decreased for good cause
by the Division of Securities to 5,000 dollars, or a security bond
may be posted in lieu of the net worth requirement." The Division
of Securities is authorized to formulate regulations in order to determine the "applicant's business repute and qualifications to act as
a dealer in securities."41 This investiture of power has been objected to as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.'
However, in view of the fact that the legislature has unequivocally
enunciated the policy of protecting the public against fraudulent
investments, and in view of the subject matter being regulated and
the safeguard of judicial review, the merit of this objection is somewhat mitigated.4" Furthermore, it would be difficult to formulate
objective criteria which reflect business reputation - a concept
which is somewhat nebulous in that it is founded upon cumulative
behavior and practices which establish an ultimate impression. Some
courts have readily expressed the view that such vesting of power in
a state executive officer is valid." Supporting this position is an
Ohio decision in which a provision in the first Oio Blue Sky Law
was held not to be in conflict with the Ohio constitution.4 5 The
section under attack permitted the Commissioner of Securities to
determine the required amount of the dealer's bond but did not set
forth standards for such determination.
The requirement that the Division of Securities be satisfied "that
the applicant is of good business repute"46 patently contemplates
regulation beyond the assurance of dealer solvency. Because this
phrase is so broad and because it lacks strict objective standards for
determining the qualification of a license, it was criticized as granting
38 See OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.15; Form 18; Regulation DS-2 in 2 CCH BLUE
SKY L. REP. 5 38662.
39
Regulation DS-4, in 2 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 38664.
4

o Ibt.

41 OHio REv. CODE § 1707.15, 1707.20.
42 See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 545 (1917); Indemnity Ins. Co. v.
Phillippi, 48 Ohio App. 248, 192 N.E. 884 (1934)
43
See Coady v. Leonard, 132 Ohio St. 329, 7 N.E.2d 649 (1937); State v. Messenger, 63 Ohio St. 398, 59 N.E. 105 (1900); 1 OHIO JUR. 2d Admmrstratve Law
and Procedure § 27 (1953); 10 OHIO JUR. 2d ConstitutionalLaw § 312 (1954)
44 See People v. Federal Sur. Co., 336 Ill. 472, 168 N.E. 401 (1929); Indemnity
Ins. Co. v. Phillippi, 48 Ohio App. 248, 192 N.E. 884 (1934)
45
Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Phillippi, supra note 44.
46 OHIo REV. CODE §§ 1707.15, 1707.20.

1966]

CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS

1103

a state executive officer the power to arbitrarily affect the right of
contract and the right to conduct a proper business by either granting, or refusing to issue, a license.4" This objection was answered
in the Hall case where the Supreme Court ruled that the powers
conferred upon the executive officer were neither arbitrary nor contrary to due process under the fourteenth amendment." Although
the first Ohio Blue Sky Law did not provide for a hearing when a
license was refused, there were provisions for judicial review of the
commissioner's decision.49 The present Ohio Securities Act provides
for judicial review. In addition, when a license is to be revoked, a
hearing is required; " and when a license is refused, a hearing may
be requested by the applicant. 5 The hearing is required by, and
must be conducted in accordance with, the Ohio Administrative
Procedure Act. " It appears, therefore, that in light of the foregoing safeguards the Ohio Securities Act could not be validly assailed
on the basis that it denies due process.
(3) Security Regulation and Registration.-The OSA divides
securities into three categories: those that are exempt from registration;"4 those that require registration by description; and those
that are neither exempt nor require registration, but which must be
qualified. " Accordingly, unless exempted, the securities must be
approved by the Division of Securities before they are sold. "7 This
preventive procedure affords investors greater protection than could
be achieved solely by fraud provisions directed toward pumshment of
violators. " The burden of proving an exemption is upon the individual asserting it." This procedure has been held constitutional
on the rationale that a state legislature may change rules of evidence
47

See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917).
481d. at 554.
49 103 Ohio Laws 743 (1913).
50 OHiO REV. CODE §§ 1707.19, 1707.22.
51 OIO REV. CODE § 1707.19.
52
OHIO REV. CODE ch. 119.
53
OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.01 (B) defines the term "security" in very broad terms.
See Note, 17 W REs. L REV__. (1966).
54 Omo REv. CODE 5 1707.02; See-Note, 17 W RES. L REV ... (1966).
55 OHio REv. CODE 5 1707.05.
56 Omo REv. CODE 5 1707.09.
57 See Boesel, Analysts of the Ohm Securties Act, 5 W RES. L. REv. 352, 358
(1954).
68 Id. at 356-58.
59 OHo REV. CODE § 1707.44.

1104

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[VoL 17 1098

since an accused has no inviolable right in presumptions or rules
of evidence.6"
Anyone seeking to qualify a security6 ' or register it by description must supply the Division of Securities with detailed information. The Division may refuse to qualify a security if it determines
that the business of the issuer is fraudulently conducted or that the
proposed offer or disposal of securities is on "grossly unfair terms.""°
Similarly, the Division may suspend or revoke a registration for the
same reason.6" Although the Division does not have the authority
to revoke or suspend a registration except as provided by statute,6 5
the use of the phrase "grossly unfair terms" in effect, empowers the
Division to modify the OSA by rules, regulations and orders interpretng the phrase.66
"Grossly unfair terms," like the phrase requiring a licensee applicant to be of "good business repute,"67 presents an interesting question of delegation of legislative power.6" The legislature has dearly
defined the statutory policy as the protection of the investing public, but the use of ultra-broad standards gives the Division of
Securities almost unlimited latitude in the administration of the act.
However, as a practical matter, it would be quite difficult for the
legislature to set forth specific guidelines, particularly in the area
of terms of the security, since the inventive genius of the financial
world and of lawyers would soon create means of circumventing
any inflexible standard.6" Impracticability of formulating specific
standards because of the subject matter tends to mitigate the forcefulness of the argument that there is an unconstitutional delegation

of legislative power.7

In addition, the provisions providing for

60

Catterlin v. State, 16 Ohio L Abs. 410 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed, 128 Ohio
St. 110, 190 N.E. 578 (1934).
61 See OHno REv. CODE § 1707.09. See also OHio Rnv. CODE § 1707.10 dealing
with provisional registration by qualification.
62
OIo REv. CODE § 1707.05.
6
3 Oio REV. CODE § 1707.09.
64
OIO REV. CODE § 1707.13.
65 1934 OPS. ATr'Y GEN. (Ohio) 2664.
66 See Nida, The Ohio Division of Securities and the Ohio Securities Act, 13 OHio
ST. L.J. 427, 438 (1952).
6
7 OHIo RV. CODE § 1707.16. See also text accompanying notes 41-51 supra.
68
See text accompanying notes 42-52 supra.
69
See Matz v. J. L. Curtis Cartage Co., 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N.E.2d 220 (1937);
1 OmIo JuR. 2d Administrative Law and Procedure § 30 (1953)
70
See State v. Messenger, 63 Ohio St. 398, 59 NE. 105 (1900), Blackman v. Board

of Liquor Control, 95 Ohio App. 177, 113 NXE.2d 893, appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St.
368, 109 N.E.2d 475 (1952).
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judicial review7 and for application of the Ohio Administrative
Procedure Act,72 which provides for a hearing before the Division's
rulings can be executed, would appear to assure that fair and just
treatment would be preserved regardless of the questionable delegation of legislative power.7 3
The Division has ruled that "grossly unfair" terms include preferred stock which does not gain voting rights in the event of default
of dividend payments (such terms constitute a prima facie presumption of unfairness) ;74 a promissory note supported by an unreasonable
ratio between debt and eqmty;7 5 sales of similar securities to corporate employees at a lower price than offered to the public on or
about the same date, since this would result in dilution of the public's equity because of the higher price paid for the security by it;7
sales of corporate securities to the corporation's promoters to be
subsequently sold to the public at a higher price without improvement in the corporation's financial position;77 and the issuance of
non-voting stock which lacks a specified dividend right where the
corporate directors have full discretion to allocate or not to allocate
funds from which dividends are to be paid, in conjunction with the
The
issuance of another class of stock solely to management7
Division has also ruled that preferred stock which provides that

dividends are not cumulative but which provides that voting rights
may be exercised upon the continuous failure to pay dividends,
does not constitute grossly unfair terms.79 It can be readily observed from the foregoing rulings that the Division can quite easily
assume the role of the public's financial advisor.

It is also readily discernible that since the phrase "grossly unfair" is so broad, it lends itself to flexibility which in turn greatly
decreases the facility of obtaining a reversal of the administrative
ruling on appeal."s It appears that the only limitation upon the
71

See OHIo REV. CODE § 1707.22 providing for appeals in accordance with the

Ohio Admimstrative Procedure Act, OH~o REV. CODE ch. 119.
72 Ibid.
73

See Strain v. Southerton, 148 Ohio St. 153, 74 NXE.2d 69 (1947); 1 OHIO JUR.

2d Administrative Law and Procedure § 29 (1953).
74

Ruling No. 16, in 2 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 38718.

75

Informal ruling cited in Nida, supra note 66, at 438.

76 Ruling No. 19, in 2 CCH BLUE SKY L REP. 5 38719.
77

Ruling No. 20, in 2 CCH BLUE SKY L REP. 5 38719.
Ruling No. 18, in 2 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 9 38718.
79
Ruling No. 17, in 2 CCH BLUE SKY L REP. 9 38718.
80 See Boesel, supra note 57, at 364.
78
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Division in this respect is that it cannot act arbitrarily or wantonly,
or act to abuse its discretionary power8"
II.

CONCLUSION

In addition to the basic objection that the Ohio Blue Sky Law
is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, other objections have been lodged against it, most of which have been held
to be without merit.'
The Ohio law was said to deny equal protection of the laws, to impose burdens on interstate commerce, and to
constitute a deprivation of property without due process of law '
These arguments were summarily disposed of in the Hall case. In
that case the Supreme Court ruled that the discriminations contained
in the first Ohio Blue Sky Law were within the state power of dassification." The Court also stated that, since there was a right to
judicial review, the requirements of due process were not violated. 5
In view of the fact that the present OSA provides for hearings in
conformity with the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act, it appears
that any objection based on lack of due process is precluded unless,
of course, the hearing is a sham. The effect on interstate commerce
was held to be incidental in that the act extended only to dispositions of securities within the state;"0 the Court found that there
was no impediment on securities brought into the state except that
they be disposed of within the state solely by licensed dealers.8
In
this regard it is significant to note that the Division of Securities
has ruled that where a sale is to be made by a person (underwriter)
outside of Ohio, registration of the security in Ohio is not required.8 8
In addition, it has been stated that the exemptions contained m
the first Ohio Blue Sky Law were such that they eliminated all

81 See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 554 (1917); Boesel, supra note 57,
at 358.
82

See Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Koeneke, 137 Kan. 7, 20 P.2d
(1933). Contra, Ops. ATry
5635.
8
3 See Hall v. Geiger-Jones
84 Ibul.

Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917)
But see Cities Serv. Co. v.
460 (1931); Liley v. Seueat, 110 Fla. 362, 149 So. 48
GEN. (Ala.) (1934), in 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 5
Co., supra note 82, at 545.

85 Id. at 539-40.
86 Id. at 557-58.
8T Ibd.
88

Ruling No. 11, in 2 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 9 38711.
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serious89 questions that the law unduly burdened legitimate businesses.
It would seem from the foregoing that the only reasonable basis
for attacking the constitutionality of the present Ohio Securities
Act, other than perhaps the broadness of its scope extending to the
secondary market," is the administration and application of the act.
This contention has the inherent, and seldom met, burden of proving
abuse of discretion. Consequently, it would seem that the OSA is
quite impervious to constitutional attack. This conclusion is supported by Ohio judicial decisions which have denied hearings on
the constitutionality of the act."1
PHILLIP J. CAMPANELLA

89

See Laylin, The Ohio "Blue Sky Law" Cases, 15 MICH. L. REV. 369, 377 (1917),
where it is stated "It is to be observed that the exemptions in the Ohio Law are of such
character and extent as to remove all serious claim that it unnecessarily burdens business
that is clearly legitimate." See also Groby v. State, 109 Ohio St. 543, 549, 143 N.E.
126 (1924).
90
See text accompanying notes 14-32 supra.
91See State v. Weger, 133 Ohio St. 23, 10 N.E.2d 634 (1937); Bush v. Hague,
128 Ohio St. 342, 191 N.E. 5 (1934); Hoyt v. Geo. W Stone Co., 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
533 (C.P. 1929).

